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INTRODUCTION
Many people do not know this, but the global community has

created an international prisoner transfer regime that allows individuals
who are incarcerated in foreign countries to transfer back to their home
country to serve out the remainder of their sentences. The driving principle
is that prisoners are more likely to be rehabilitated in their home country
because of their familiarity with the language and culture and proximity to
family and friends. The regime is incorporated in many multilateral and
bilateral treaties to which the United States is a party. The treaties never
require that the country holding the prisoner transfer him or her back to
their home country. Indeed, only candidates who demonstrate low levels
of culpability for their crimes are considered good candidates for transfer.
Additionally, prisoners who leave victims in their country of incarceration
are considered especially poor candidates.
However, the treaties do require the country holding the prisoner to
notify that prisoner of his or her right to apply for transfer. In the federal
prison system of the U.S, this is not a problem; almost all foreign nationals
who are party to a prisoner transfer treaty with the U.S. are notified of
their right to do so in a timely manner. However, in state prisons there is
no such guarantee because the federal government of the U.S. does not
require state compliance with these treaties. The argument essentially is
that these prisoner transfer treaties are non-self executing and therefore
cannot impose any obligations on the states within the U.S. without
Congress implementing legislation requiring such compliance. The
Congress has not done so. Wrapped up in this argument is the notion that
the structure of our federated system precludes the federal government
from encroaching on an area of governance so clearly within the sphere of
state sovereignty as prisons. This is bad law and bad foreign policy.
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This article will demonstrate that foreign nationals incarcerated in
U.S. State prisons, who are nationals of countries that are parties to the
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons2 (hereinafter COE
Convention), are able to assert their right to timely notification of their
right to transfer. These rights come via the Ex parte Young doctrine3. This
article will analyze the judgments of the International Court of Justice
(hereinafter ICJ) in Germany v. United States (hereinafter LaGrand Case
or LaGrand) 4 and Mexico v. United States (hereinafter Avena)5 to show
that the Court’s analysis of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations6
(hereinafter VCCR) to confer individual rights on foreign nationals should
be followed to hold that international prisoner transfer treaties also confer
rights on individuals. That is, if U.S. state courts interpreted the COE
Convention in the same manner as the ICJ interpreted the VCCR, then
U.S. state courts would find that the COE Convention is self-executing
and therefore endow certain foreign nationals with justiciable rights of
which the courts could enjoin enforcement.
This paper asserts that the ICJ’s method of treaty interpretation is
more appropriate than the ambiguous and inconsistent methods by which
U.S. courts analyze the legal force of treaties in light of both international
legal norms and the U.S. Constitution itself. This argument has three main
2

Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, 25 U.S.T. 2867 (March 21, 1983),
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/112.htm [hereinafter
COE Convention].
3

See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

4

LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104 (June 27), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm.
5

Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (March 31),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm.
6

See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, April
24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 262-512, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/consul.htm [hereinafter VCCR].
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components: 1) Federal courts should not distinguish between selfexecuting and non self-executing treaties in determining the domestic
enforceability of U.S. treaty obligations because such a distinction was not
contemplated by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution; 2) Courts should
interpret treaties from a contractual perspective and therefore the U.S.
should not unilaterally determine whether it is bound by its own treaty
obligations after the fact and 3) The increasing importance of international
law in the modern world demands that the U.S. pay greater deference to
the role of international law in our national legal system.
Next, this paper will establish that the individual states of the U.S.
have a history of non-compliance with international prisoner transfer
treaties. The repeated failure of the states to notify foreign nationals of
their rights under the applicable prisoner transfer treaties is similar to that
of Arizona’s failure to notify the LaGrand brothers of their rights under
the VCCR. Because the rights of prisoners under our foreign treaties
should not depend on whether they are in state or federal prison, foreign
nationals in state custody who are not informed of their right to transfer
should be able to enjoin state officials to assert that right and ensure future
compliance. This argument stems from the fundamental premise,
demonstrated in Part IV, that obligatory rights created under treaties are on
par with federal law and thus should be enforceable by foreign nationals in
U.S. federal courts. This demonstration of U.S. compliance with its treaty
obligations will not only galvanize adherence to constitutional authority in
domestic courts, but will, more importantly, diminish the growing
resentment of the U.S. abroad due to the U.S.’ history of treaty violations
and the international community’s belief that the Bush Administration’s
unilaterally invaded Iraq.
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LAGRAND AND AVENA
On June 27, 2001, the International Court of Justice held in

LaGrand that the VCCR confers on foreign nationals who are arrested and
detained in the U.S. an individual right to be notified of their right to
communicate with their local consulate regarding their criminal
proceedings.7 The ICJ found that the U.S. had breached its obligation
under the VCCR to inform the LaGrand brothers of their right to consular
access. The Court reaffirmed this decision in March 2004 in Avena,
holding that the U.S. had violated the right of 51 Mexican nationals to be
notified of their right to consular access.

The facts of LaGrand are

extreme, and its unfortunate conclusion was the execution of Walter and
Karl LaGrand despite a provisional order by the ICJ to stay their
executions until further proceedings could determine the merits of
Germany’s claim against the U.S. It should be noted that this article does
not purport to comment on the fate of the LaGrand brothers. The
“unfortunate conclusion” referred to is the failure of the U.S. government,
in this case, to uphold a provisional order of the ICJ.
A) FACTS OF LAGRAND
Walter and Karl LaGrand were born in Germany in 1962 and 1963,
respectively.8 These two German nationals moved, with their mother, to
the United States in 1963, and for the majority of their lives they had
permanent residence in the United States. The LeGrands even became the
adoptive children of a U.S. national.9 The LaGrand brothers were arrested
on January 7, 1982, as suspects in a bank robbery in Marana, Arizona.
During the commission of the robbery, a bank manager was murdered and
7

LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104.

8

Id. ¶ 13.

9

Id.
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another bank employee was seriously injured.10 The LaGrand brothers
were subsequently tried in the Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona,
where they were both convicted of murder in the first degree, attempted
murder in the first degree, attempted armed robbery and two counts of
kidnapping.11 Both were sentenced to death on December 14, 1984.12
The U.S. and Germany were parties to the multilateral Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations and the Optional Protocol at all times
relevant to these proceedings.13 The Optional Protocol to that Convention
Article 36, paragraph 1(b) provides:
"[I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the
receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular
post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or
to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.
Any communication addressed to the consular post by the
person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall be
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay
of his rights under this subparagraph."14
The United States conceded that it had violated its obligations under this
provision because the LaGrands were not notified of their right to
communicate with their consulate.15 After two unsuccessful appeals with
state-appointed counsel, the LaGrand brothers notified their consular post
in June 1992.16 The LaGrand brothers did not learn of their rights under
the Vienna convention from the Arizona authorities, but from some other
10

Id. ¶ 14.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 15.

14

Id. (emphasis added).

15

Id.

16

Id. ¶ 18 – 22.
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source.17 It was not until December 21, 1998, that the LaGrands were
formally notified of their right to consular access by U.S. authorities.18
The LaGrands appealed to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals to set
aside their death sentences on the grounds that the U.S. had failed to
comply with Article 36 1(b) of the VCCR.19 The court rejected this claim
on the grounds of the procedural default rule. The LaGrands had failed to
raised the issue in state court and could not show cause or prejudice that
precluded them from doing so on appeal.20 Karl LaGrand was executed
on February 24, 1999.21
On March 2, 1999, Germany instituted proceedings against the
United States in the ICJ requesting a provisional measure that would
enjoin the United States and to “take all measures at its disposal to ensure
that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these
proceedings…”22 The ICJ granted Germany’s request and issued a
provisional order to that effect the following day.23

Despite the

provisional order, Walter LaGrand was executed later that same day.24
Germany brought several claims against the United States in the
ICJ as a result of the United States’ violation of the Convention and its
failure to comply with the provisional order. The Court found that the
VCCR had created an obligation on the U.S. to inform the LaGrand
brothers of their right to consular access, and that the U.S. had breached

17

Id. ¶ 22.

18

Id. ¶ 24.

19

LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 27-29.

20

Id.

21

See LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 29.

22

Id. ¶ 30.

23

Id. ¶ 34.

24

Id.
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that obligation by its failure to inform them of their rights within a
reasonable time. Subsequently, Mexico brought a claim against the U.S.
alleging that the U.S. had similarly violated the rights of 52 of its nationals
by failing to inform them of their rights under the VCCR.25 Again, the ICJ
found that U.S. had violated the rights of the Mexican nationals by not
informing them of their right to consular access pursuant to the VCCR.26
This article will focus on the court’s interpretation of the VCCR so as to
confer individual rights on foreign nationals.
B) THE ICJ INTERPRETATION OF THE VCCR IN LAGRAND AND
AVENA
The ICJ specifically interpreted Article 36, paragraph 1 of the
VCCR to create individual rights for foreign nationals of Member States
who are arrested in other Member states.27 The court noted that the
purpose of Article 36 is to determine the obligations that the State who is
holding the foreign national has towards that prisoner due to nationality.28
The court emphasized the final sentence of paragraph 1 (b): “The said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights
under this subparagraph.”29 The ICJ also emphasized that Article 1 (c)
precludes the sending State from providing consular assistance to the
prisoner “if he expressly opposes such action.”30 The Court concluded
that: “[t]he clarity of these provisions, viewed in their context, admits of
25

See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (March 31).

26

Id.

27

LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 77; see also Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 40 (stating that “The Court would recall that,
in the LaGrand case, it recognized that ‘Article 36, paragraph 1 [of the Vienna
Convention] creates individual rights [for the national concerned]...’”).
28

LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 77.

29

Id.

30

Id.
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no doubt…[b]ased on the text of these provisions…Article 36, paragraph
1, creates individual rights…[t]hese rights were violated in the present
case.”31
The Court based its conclusion that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates
individual rights on its reasoning that the context of the Article was to
define the obligations that the sending State has toward the detainee and
the receiving State, and on the text of the provision.32 The text is explicit:
it provides that the sending state “shall inform” the prisoner of “his
rights.”33 Logically, if the sending state is obligated to inform the prisoner
of the substance of the provision, then it follows that the prisoner
necessarily has a right to be so informed.34
The ICJ interpreted the VCCR to confer an individual right on
each foreign nationals even though the language of the preamble to the
VCCR makes it clear that the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the
Convention were not meant to benefit individuals.35 The preamble clearly
states:
The States Parties to the present Convention… Believing
that an international convention on consular relations,
privileges and immunities would also contribute to the
development of friendly relations among nations,
irrespective of their differing constitutional and social
systems, Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and
immunities is not to benefit individuals…36

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, ¶ 77.

35

Id.

36

Id. (emphasis added).
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It could be argued that the preamble precludes any possibility of
this treaty creating an enforceable individual right. The ICJ, however,
chose to interpret Article 36 as to confer individual rights on foreign
nationals despite the anticipation and dismissal of that possibility in the
preamble.
This disregard of hortatory language strikes at the very essence of
the court’s reasoning. The language of the preamble is not obligatory in
nature.

Rather, this disclaimer of individual rights is cast in vague,

hortatory language: “[b]elieving, …[r]ealizing…”37 The ICJ clearly chose
to give greater weight to the obligatory language of Article 36(1) because
the specific and unambiguous force of that Article evidences and imposes
particular obligations upon the parties who agree to be bound by it, as
opposed to ideals to which they agree to aspire.
Further, the ICJ in Avena specifically noted the universal
applicability of its reasoning:
To avoid any ambiguity, it should be made clear that, while
the Court has stated concerns the Mexican nationals whose
cases have been brought before it by Mexico, the Court has
been addressing the issues of principle raised in the course
of the present proceedings from the viewpoint of the
general application of the Vienna Convention, and there
can be no question of making an a contrario argument in
any respect of the Court’s findings in the present
Judgment.38
While it is clear that the court is specifically referring to the VCCR
in this passage, it is relevant to note that the ICJ explicitly addresses an
issue of principle. It is precisely this principle that suggests the Council of
Europe Convention on the International Transfer of Prisoners also creates
individual rights by virtue of the obligations it creates on receiving States.
37

Id.
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THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE CONVENTION ALSO CREATES
RIGHTS BY VIRTUE OF OBLIGATIONS
The ICJ’s analysis of the VCCR demonstrates that international

prisoner transfer treaties also confer individual rights on foreign national
detainees by virtue of the text and context of their relevant provisions.39
The U.S. is a party to several multilateral and bilateral international
prisoner treaties, though a comprehensive analysis of each would be far
too cumbersome for the purposes of this article. This article will only
analyze the language of the Council of Europe Convention (COE
Convention), a multilateral treaty that has been ratified by 52 countries.40
The analysis will demonstrate that the text of COE Convention confers an
individual right on foreign nationals of member states detained in the U.S.
for the same reasons that the ICJ determined that the VCCR did: the text
of the COE Convention clearly creates a binding obligation on member
States to inform foreign nationals of their rights under the treaty, and to
process their applications in a timely fashion.
The COE Convention and the VCCR both essentially impose an
obligation on the states to give special consideration to foreign nationals
who have become the object of their criminal justice systems. The primary
objective of the COE Convention is to further the rehabilitation of the
prisoner, while that of the VCCR is to “ensure the efficient performance of
functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States…”41

38

Avena, supra note 5, ¶ 151.
See COE Convention, supra note 2, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/112.htm.

39

40

See id.

41

See VCCR, supra note 6, at preamble.
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Recall that the ICJ did not allow the vague language of the preamble to the
VCCR to undermine the obligations cast in Article 36.42
The COE Convention, unlike the VCCR, expressly states that the
rehabilitation of sentenced persons is in fact one of the primary objectives
of the treaty:
The member States of the Council of Europe and the other
States, signatory hereto,
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to
achieve a greater unity between its members; Desirous of
further developing international co-operation in the field of
criminal law; Considering that such co-operation should
further the ends of justice and the social rehabilitation of
sentenced persons.43
It is clear that this treaty has express humanitarian policy goals.
Signatories to the agreement expressly agree to such goals, as opposed to
signatories to the VCCR, expressly dismiss them.44 It follows then that if
the VCCR can impute individual rights on foreign nationals, even though
its preamble expressly states that the privileges that arise out of the treaty
are not meant to benefit individuals, then surely the COE Convention,
which was drafted with the expressed purpose of benefiting individual
human beings, should at the very least lend itself to such an interpretation.
However, the ICJ limited its interpretation of the VCCR to the ordinary
meaning of the words chosen by the parties, only giving legal effect to the
explicit obligations rather than to vague language beyond judicially
manageable standards.
Article 36 of the VCCR and Article 4 of the COE Convention both
describe the obligations that the State holding the prisoner has to the

42

See discussion infra Part II.B.

43

See COE Convention, supra note 2, at preamble (emphasis added).

44

Id.
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prisoner and to the prisoner’s country of nationality.45 Article 4 of the
COE Convention is titled “Obligation to furnish information.”46 Paragraph
1 states that: “[a]ny sentenced person to whom this Convention may apply
shall be informed by the sentencing State of this Convention.”47 Paragraph
2 states in relevant part: “If the sentenced person has expressed an interest
to the sentencing State in being transferred under this Convention, that
State shall so inform the administering State…”48 The “obligation to
furnish information” described in this Article is similar to the obligation
imposed in Article 36 of the VCCR, which defines the duties that the
sentencing State has to the detainee and his country of nationality.49
Therefore, the context that the court emphasized in defining the individual
right created by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is similar to that of
Article 4 of the COE Convention and supports the argument that this
Article also creates individual rights.50
It is clear that the obligations imposed on the sentencing State in
Article 4 of the COE Convention create individual rights for foreign
national detainees in light of the LaGrand holding.51 Article 4, paragraph
1, orders that if the Convention applies to any detainee, then that detainee
“shall be informed” by the State detaining him of his rights under that
Convention.52 The use of the word “shall” is dispositive here: it clearly
demonstrates a mandatory obligation on the receiving State by virtue of
45

See VCCR, supra note 6, at art. 36. See also COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4.

46

See COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4 (emphasis added).

47

Id. (emphasis added).

48

Id. (emphasis added). The “administering State” is that State of nationality of the
prisoner.

49

Id.; see also VCCR, supra note 6, at art. 36.

50

See LaGrand, supra note 4, ¶ 77. See also COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4.

51

See LaGrand, supra note 4, ¶ 77. See also COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4.

52

See COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4 (emphasis added).
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the detainee’s status as a national of a foreign country who is a party to
this Convention.53 Paragraph 2 of that Article demands that “If the
sentenced person has expressed an interest…in being transferred…that
State shall so inform the administering State…”54 The language here is
just as clear, except here the obligation of the receiving State to inform the
sending State is created as a result of the prisoner’s expressed request in
applying for a transfer pursuant to this Convention. The texts of these
provisions mirror those of Article 36 of the VCCR.55
These two Articles create obligations on the sending State by use
of a word that has no ambiguity attached to it, “shall.” The word “shall”
unequivocally creates obligations. By the use of “shall”, it demonstrates
that when one applies the reasoning of the ICJ in LaGrand, Article 4 of
the COE Convention creates individual rights for foreign detainees.56
Both the context and the specific language of these two provisions are
unambiguous and identical in the types of obligations they impose in
regard to foreign detainees, and should, therefore, be similarly construed.
If one adopts the method of treaty interpretation employed by the ICJ in
LaGrand, which construes the plain meaning of obligations expressly
agreed upon by the parties to create a right in the beneficiary of such
obligations, then the COE Convention creates the same right for foreign
nationals of Member States serving determinate prison sentences in the
U.S.

53

Id.

54

Id. at art. 4, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).

55

See VCCR, supra note 6, at art. 36.

56

See COE Convention, supra note 2, at art. 4

Vol. 3 [2005] DOMESTIC ENFORCEABILITY OF TREATY-BASED RIGHTS
Louis Antonacci

IV.

36

TREATY OBLIGATIONS CAN CREATE DOMESTICALLY
ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS

The ICJ’s method of analyzing the VCCR to create rights where it
unambiguously creates obligations is the proper way to analyze an
agreement between sovereign nations. The Constitution commands it by
virtue of the Treaty Power57 and the Supremacy Clause.58 History provides
ample support for a plain meaning interpretation of these provisions.
Nonetheless, the U.S. courts have a confused and divergent history of
determining the judicially enforceable rights and obligations created by
treaties, limiting their enforceability by virtue of the federalist structure of
our government and by applying distinctions such as “self-executing” and
“non-self-executing” where they do not apply.
It is the position of this article that domestic courts should interpret
the obligatory terms of a treaty for what it is: a contract between sovereign
nations. If it is determined by the courts that the obligations created by the
treaty are beyond the scope of the treaty power by virtue of its subject
matter or other constitutional limitations, then such a treaty provision
should be rendered unconstitutional for those reasons. A court should not,
however, interpret the expressed obligations of treaties as judicially
unenforceable because they are non-self-executing. This will serve to
strengthen the role of international law in the U.S. and encourage other
countries to follow suit, thereby creating a respect for international legal

57

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.

58

See Id., at art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges of every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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norms that the U.S. and the global community can rely upon as tangible
and enforceable.
This article has established that the COE Convention creates a
right for foreign nationals of member states who are incarcerated in the
U.S. to be notified of their right to apply for transfer to their home
country. Unfortunately, the individual U.S. states have a poor record of
compliance with our international prisoner transfer treaties.59

Ronald

Reagan signed the COE Convention on March 21, 1983, and it was fully
ratified and deposited by the U.S. on March 11, 1985.60 On September 2,
1997, the U.S. government sent a declaration to the Secretariat General of
the Council of Europe who deposited it on September 3, 1997.61 Relevant
parts of the declaration read:
Under Article 3, paragraph 1(f), of the Convention on the
Transfer of Sentenced Persons, both the sentencing and the
administering States must agree to the transfer of a
sentenced person. In the case of the United States of
America, where a sentenced person has been convicted by
a state of the United States of crimes under the laws of that
state and is in the custody of authorities of that state, the
Government of the United States will not agree to a
transfer unless the competent state authorities first give
their consent.
In any such case, the state government must have state
legislation authorizing consent to such transfers and be
prepared to exercise that authority in the specific case…
As just noted, however, even in those states that have such
authority, specific consent of the appropriate state
59

See David S. Finkelstein, “Ever been in a [Foreign] Prison?”: The Implementation of
Transfer of Penal Sanctions Treaties by U.S. States, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 153.
(October 1997).
60
61

See COE Convention, supra note 2.

See Council of Europe, List of Declarations Made with Respect to Treaty No. 112, at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=112&CM=8&DF=
30/01/05&CL=ENG&VL=1 (last visited Mar. 5, 2003).
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authorities would be required for transfer of any particular
individual who was convicted of violating that state's laws.
Consent may not be presumed from the existence of
statutory authority; indeed, there are some states which
authorize few, or no, transfers notwithstanding the
statutory authority to consent. While the Government of
the United States strongly encourages state participation in
transfers under the Convention, the United States
Government cannot compel a state to consent to the
transfer of an individual who was convicted of violating
that state's laws.62
The U.S. has clearly conceded that it cannot compel state
governments to comply with the terms of the agreement that it has signed
and ratified.

It does not seem proper that a national government is

powerless to enter into agreements with other sovereign nations that grant
reciprocal rights to each other’s nationals in their respective countries and
simultaneously bind its constituent bodies. Such a stance diminishes the
ability of other nations to rely on the U.S. as a contracting party and
thereby provokes serious resentment towards the U.S, which in turn
threatens the security of U.S. nationals abroad. The enforceability of
treaties that confer rights on foreign nationals in the U.S. should not be
limited by the federalist structure of our republic if the treaties are
otherwise constitutional, because such a limitation was contemplated and
dismissed by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution.
A) CONSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT AND LIMITATIONS
The Constitution of the U.S. plainly puts treaties made under the
authority of the United States on par with federal legislation by virtue of
the Supremacy Clause.63

Mr. Justice Butler properly interpreted this

62

See id., at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=112&CM=8&DF=
30/01/05&CL=ENG&VL=1 (emphasis added).
63

See U.S. CONST.. art.VI, cl. 2.
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simple provision in Asakura v. City of Seattle: “[t]he treaty-making power
of the United States is not limited by any express provision of the
Constitution, and, though it does not extend ‘so far as to authorize what
the Constitution forbids,’ it does extend to all proper subjects of
negotiation between our government and other nations.”64 The historical
records of the ratification of the constitution make it clear that the Framers
intended precisely this interpretation of the Treaty Power and the
Supremacy Clause.
The Articles of Confederation did not give the central government
the ability to ensure state compliance with the treaty obligations of the
national government, which was a principle reasons that the Framers
decided to establish a new government under the Constitution rather than
simply amend the Articles of Confederation.65 As James McHenry noted
at the Federal Convention of 1787, “if a State acts against a foreign power
contrary to the law of nations or violates a treaty, [the Confederation]
cannot punish that State, or compel its obedience to the treaty.”66 John Jay
also commented on the importance of centralizing the Treaty Power and
imposing it on the individual states:
It is of high importance to the peace of America that she
observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to
me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and
punctually done by one national government than it could
be either by thirteen separate States or by three or four
individual confederacies.67

64

See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924). (internal quotation citing
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890)).

65

See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1103. (1992).

66

See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 24-25 (Max Farrand
ed., rev. ed. 1966).

67

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 14-15 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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James Madison expressed similar sentiments, “[i]f we are to be one nation
in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations.”68 These
comments by the drafters of the U.S. Constitution make it clear that they
realized the importance of the ability of the federal government to speak
with one voice. The States had been undermining the U.S.’s ability to
effectively manage its foreign affairs and it was clear that we would be
unable to promote international comity if other nations could not rely on it
to make agreements that would bind its constituent bodies.69
As Carlos Manuel Vazquez noted in his article, Treaty-Based
Rights and Remedies of Individuals:
[t]he Framers corrected this problem with respect to treaties
in exactly the same way they corrected it with respect to the
statutes of the Union and the Constitution itself: they
declared all three to be the supreme Law of the Land, and
accordingly operative directly on individuals and
enforceable in the courts.70
Clearly the Framers intended that the U.S’ international treaties be on par
with federal legislation and binding on state governments. Mr. Justice
Sutherland articulated the proper reading of the treaty power in U.S. v.
Belmont, “state constitutions, state laws, and state policies are irrelevant to
the inquiry and decision. It is inconceivable that any of them can be
interposed as an obstacle to the effective operation of a federal
constitutional power.”71

68

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 279 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).

69

See Vazquez, supra note 65, at 1103. Prof. Vasquez gives some examples of problems
the U.S. was having while concluding a commercial treaty with Great Britain because of
previous state noncompliance with other treaties.

70

Id. at 1104 (internal quotations omitted).

71

301 U.S. 324, 332 (1937).
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The treaty power is inherently limited by the Constitution, and thus
no treaty can be made that would be repugnant to its terms and spirit.72
For example, a treaty could not be made that would criminalize certain
acts in the United States because federal criminal statutes can only be
legislated with the consent of Congress. Thus such a treaty provision
would be patently inconsistent with the terms of the Constitution. There is
also an inherent subject matter limitation on the scope of the treaty power,
and the power of the federal government to bind the states by its treaty
obligations should not be expanded beyond the proper objects of foreign
relations.73 This distinction is not easily demarcated with a bright-line
rule, but it is certainly within the capacity of federal courts to determine if
a treaty addresses the proper subject matter when asked to rule on its
enforceability. An example in which the federal government is acting
beyond its proper scope of power to bind the states would be one that
required certain curriculum in public education in the U.S. and other
72

See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); see also, Charles A. Bradley, The
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 413 (November, 1998).
Bradley notes that the records of the Virginia Ratifying Convention make it clear that the
Framers did intend there to be limits on the treaty power, but those limits were essentially
that the delegation be the proper object of a treaty, i.e., the subject matter of treaties
should be germane to foreign affairs. The author does not wish to distort the treaty power
or the foreign commerce clause in the same way that the interstate commerce clause has
been so manipulated, but surely a treaty regarding the rights of foreign nationals who are
prisoners of U.S. federal or state correctional systems is the proper object of such an
agreement.
73

Robert Anderson makes a strong argument against this approach of a “subject matter”
limitation on the treaty power. He argues that because two nations have decided to
contract about an issue necessarily makes that issue one of international concern and
therefore the proper subject matter of a treaty. This argument is based on the notion that
the treaty power creates a right to contract for the federal government, and therefore
whatever the federal government chooses to contract on is necessarily a matter of
international concern if there is another sovereign nation who wishes to bargain on that
issue. See Robert Anderson “Ascertained in a Different Way”: The Treaty Power at the
Crossroads of Contract, Compact, and Constitution. 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 189 (2001).
The author agrees that one should take a “contract” approach to interpreting the terms of
a treaty, see infra Part IV.B.1, but takes the position that there is a subject matter
limitation on the treaty power that is beyond the Executive’s ability to find a contracting
partner.
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Clearly such a treaty operates with domestic and

international effect, and while one could argue that such a treaty may
benefit foreign relations for a variety of reasons, the severity of its impact
on domestic affairs is disproportionate to its germaneness to foreign
affairs. Put another way, the relationship between the object of the treaty
(domestic public school curriculum) and the proper subject matter of such
an agreement (foreign affairs) is far too tenuous to be persuasive and
therefore constitutional.
The Supreme Court similarly analyzed the interstate commerce
clause74 in U.S. v Morrison in the same manner and found that the
relationship of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) with interstate
commerce was deemed too attenuated to justify the Congressional basis
for the Act and its constitutionality.75 Similarly, the treaty power should
not be construed too broadly so as to dilute its enforceability and integrity,
but what is most relevant here is the assertion of the judicial capacity to
make such a determination: “[w]hether particular operations affect
interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the constitutional power of
Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative
question, and can be settled finally only by this Court.”76 Domestic courts
should assert the same ability in determining the scope of the treaty power.
If a treaty creates rights that are the proper objects of a treaty and
not inconsistent with the Constitution, then it is clear, from the above, that
our Framers intended those rights to be binding on the States.

The

Framers expressed the importance of the ability of the United States to
speak with one voice in its relations with foreign nations, and thus the

74

See U.S. CONST. art.I., § 8 ,cl. 3.

75

529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000).

76

Id. at 614.
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power of the Executive and the Senate to treaty with foreign nations to
bind the several States was deemed indispensable to the ability of the new
nation to effectively manage foreign affairs. The nation’s incorporating
document should not be perverted to diminish the value of the above
perspective simply because the U.S. is an infinitely more powerful nation
in 2004 than it was in 1787.
B) OBLIGATORY TERMS OF TREATIES ARE NECESSARILY
SELF-EXECUTING
Treaties that create obligations on states to act or not to act in
certain ways toward nationals of contracting states necessarily create a
right for those nationals within constitutional limits. This sort of treaty is
“self-executing” to the extent that it creates those rights. In order to
determine whether a treaty creates obligations on the contracting parties,
one must look to the language of the treaty itself rather than rely on the
supposed “intent” of one party to the agreement. If one party allows its
unilateral intent to supersede the agreed-upon text of the agreement, then it
will discourage other nations from negotiating with them, as well as
encourage other nations to derogate from the terms of existing and future
treaties with them. If the language of the treaty is hortatory as opposed to
obligatory, then the treaty cannot have legal force in domestic courts
without implementing legislation.77
See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) at 255152: “…[g]eneral humanitarian intent cannot impose uncontemplated obligations on treaty
signatories.”
77

The effect of a treaty can, of course, be the basis for an act of Congress. Under Article I,
Section 8, clause 18 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has power to “make all the laws
which are necessary and proper for carrying into execution, and all other powers vested
by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof.” Congress can therefore enact legislation that is necessary to carry out
the aspirations of a treaty that is properly made. Hortatory language in treaties therefore
offers more flexibility to nations in deciding how far they want to go in carrying out the
express goals of treaties. Considering this distinction in the treaty-making process makes
it appear all the more as if a country that tries to characterize a treaty cast in obligatory
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The Restatement of Foreign Relations Third has expressly
recognized the inherently self-executing nature of treaty obligations.78
One might think that the majority of the ICJ in LaGrand wrote Reporter’s
note 5 of section 111: “Provisions in treaties of friendship, commerce, and
navigation, or other agreements conferring rights on foreign nationals,
especially in matters ordinarily governed by State law, have been given
effect without any implementing legislation, their self-executing character
assumed without discussion.”79 Indeed, the ICJ expressly construed a
right for the LaGrand brothers out of the obligatory language of the
VCCR.80 In U.S. v. Rauscher,81 the Supreme Court characterized the
Kentucky Court of Appeals’ opinion as “very able” when it said:
When it is provided by treaty that certain acts shall not be
done, or that certain limitations or restrictions shall not be
disregarded or exceeded by the contracting parties, the
compact does not need to be supplemented by legislative or
executive action, to authorize the courts of justice to decline
to override those limitations or to exceed the prescribed
restrictions, for the palpable all-sufficient reason, that to do
so would not only violate the public faith, but to transgress
the ‘supreme law of the land’.82
Furthermore, the Supreme Court agreed with the self-executing
character of treaty-made obligations in Asakura v. Seattle, stating that no
municipal ordinance or state law can interfere with the obligations of the

language as somehow “non-self-executing” is, in fact, trying to alter the terms of the
agreement ex post.
78

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §111, reporter’s note 5 (1987)
(stating that “[o]bligations not to act, or to act only subject to limitations, are generally
self-executing.”).
79

Id. (emphasis added).

80

See discussion infra Part II.B.

81

119 U.S. 407, 427-28 (1886).

82

Commonwealth v. Hawes, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 697, 702-03 (1878) (emphasis added).
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U.S. under its treaties.83 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(hereinafter Vienna Convention) instructs us similarly.84 Articles 26 and
27 make it clear that: 1) all treaties in force are binding; 2) treaties in force
must be observed in good faith; and 3) States may not invoke provisions
of its internal law as an excuse not to perform its treaty obligations.85 This
seems quite contrary to the position that the U.S took in its declaration to
the COE Convention.86
The relevant authority makes it clear that when one is interpreting
the terms of a treaty to determine if the treaty creates judicially
enforceable rights, the first inquiry must be to the language of the treaty
itself.87 If sovereigns agree to obligations to act or not to act towards
individuals in a particular manner, then those individuals necessarily have
the right to be treated in such a way. Once it is determined that an
individual has a right under a treaty, the question then turns on whether
this is a judicially enforceable right, and then whether there is a remedy.
Domestic courts are reluctant to enforce treaty-based rights.88
83

See Asakura, supra note 64, at 341:
The treaty is binding on the State of Washington… The rule of equality
established by it cannot be rendered nugatory in any part of the United States by
municipal ordinances or state laws. It stands on the same footing as supremacy
as do the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States. It
operates of itself without the aid of any legislation, state or national; and it will
be applied and given authoritative effect by the courts.

84

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/ 27,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm.

85

Id. at art. 26-27.

86

See supra note 61.

87

Vazquez notes that hortatory treaty provisions could be argued to be obligatory in the
sense that the contracting parties have an obligation to act in good faith to comply with
those aspirations. He also notes, and the author agrees, that “obligations of this nature do
not give rise to correlative legal rights.” Nations have a right to expound their mutual
ideologies for political reasons, or any reason at all, without fear of later being legally
bound by them. See Vazquez, supra note 65, at 1123.

88

Id. at 1082-1083.
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C) JUDICIALLY CREATED OBSTACLES: “SELF-EXECUTING”
VERSUS “NON-SELF-EXECUTING” TREATIES
The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals has rightly described the “selfexecuting treaty” concept as “the most confounding [doctrine] in treaty
law.”89 The doctrine itself seemingly is used by the courts as another
political question, and as one author has examined in detail, the two
categories of non self-executing treaties correspond with the two
categories of political questions.90 Viewed in this light, it is clear that
courts attempt to interpret treaty obligations the same way that they do
constitutional and statutory provisions. This is why courts try to look at
the intent of treaty-drafters to determine whether the treaty is “selfexecuting.” A treaty, however, is much more akin to a contract than it is to
legislation because it is an agreement between two sovereigns who agree
on bargained-for terms rather than a unilateral assertion of authority
granted by the populous. Treaties should, therefore, be interpreted as
contracts, not legislation. In light of this, it is inappropriate to look at the
“intent” of the treaty drafters when interpreting the language of a treaty
89

U.S. v. Postal, 589 F.2d at 876 (1979).

90

Vazquez parallels “hortatory” treaty provisions to those statutory or constitutional
provisions which do not afford judicially manageable standards, and are therefore
unenforceable by the courts. He also parallels “executory” treaty provisions to legislation
that delegates rule-making authority to an administrative agency. His conclusion is best
quoted:
I do not here advocate any particular version of the political-question doctrine,
nor do I contend that it provides an independent ground for refusing to enforce
treaties that do not fit the first two categories of unenforceable treaty provisions
described above. But I do propose that the parallels between the political
question doctrine and the doctrine of self-executing treaties be recognized and
that the tension between the latter doctrine and the status of treaties as “law” be
resolved, as it is generally with constitutional provisions, not by denying the
provision’s status as law, but by determining whether there are overriding
reasons to hold that what is prima facie a “law” is nevertheless unenforceable
in the courts.
See Vazquez, supra note 65, at 1120 - 1132 (emphasis added).
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because, like all parties to a contract, each party is necessarily acting in
their own self-interest. A look into the history of international prisoner
transfer treaties will illustrate why U.S. courts should, as the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties instructs, adopt a parol evidence rule
for treaty interpretation:91 the person interpreting the treaty must confine
their interpretation to the text of the document itself unless the text is
ambiguous or would lead to an absurd result, in which case they may turn
to extrinsic evidence.
Turning to the constitutional limits of the treaty power, the
Supremacy Clause says nothing about requiring implementing legislation
in order to give force to treaties ratified by the Senate.92

However,

domestic courts seem to interpret obligatory treaty provisions under the
assumption that they cannot be given legal force unless the Executive has
manifested some subjective intent to the contrary.93 The Constitution,
however, commands that the inquiry be to the contrary: a treaty that is
obligatory in nature should be presumed to be self-executing unless it
expressly requires implementing legislation. If a claim is brought under
an obligatory treaty-provision which is beyond the scope of the treaty
power, it would then be proper for domestic courts to declare it
unenforceable because of its unconstitutionality rather than it being nonself-executing.

1. Treaties Are Contracts

91

See supra note 84.

92

See supra note 58.

93

See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 218 (2d Cir.1982); see also Sale v. Haitian Centers
Council, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2549 (1993); see also Itel Containers Intern. Corp. v. Huddleston,
113 S.Ct. 1095 (1993).
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The fundamental cause of confusion within the courts in
determining the domestic legal effects created by treaties is the courts’
tendency to interpret treaty provisions as they would legislation.
Accordingly, they are quick to turn to the travaux preparatoires of a treaty
to determine whether it is self-executing even when the plain text of the
treaty is express. However, the nature of the treaty itself and the dynamics
of the treaty-making process are much more akin to that of an international
contract, and its provisions should be interpreted accordingly.
The simplest way to compare and contrast the nature of treaties
versus legislation is to examine their respective definitions.94

The

definition of legislation is “the exercise of the power and function of
making rules (as laws) that have the force of authority by virtue of their
promulgation by an official organ of a state or other organization.”95 Such
94

MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, at http://www.m-w.com/. (last visited March 5,
2003). Full entries read:
leg·is·la·tion
1. the action of legislating; specifically : the exercise of the power and function of
making rules (as laws) that have the force of authority by virtue of their
promulgation by an official organ of a state or other organization
2. the enactments of a legislator or a legislative body
3 a matter of business for or under consideration by a legislative body
trea·ty
1. The action of treating and esp. of negotiating
2. An agreement or arrangement made by negotiation: as
a.

private treaty

b. A contract in writing between two or more political authorities (as states or
sovereigns) formally signed by representatives duly authorized and usually
ratified by the lawmaking authority of the state (the president…shall have
power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties - U.S.
Constitution art. II) compare executive agreement
3. A document embodying a negotiated agreement or contract
4. An agreement or contract (as between companies) providing for treaty reinsurance
95

Id.
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an act is unilateral. Because the person or body legislating is unilaterally
creating law, in their official capacity, with the supposed authority to do
so, their intent is important in determining the meaning of ambiguous
provisions of law.

Unlike a treaty, a piece of legislation is not an

agreement between parties. Legislation derives its power from the
authority of the law-making body to issue it, and while it may constitute a
compromise between divergent interests within that body, legislation
affects only the governed, which has given the legislator authority to
create laws without the specific consent of the governed. The governed, of
course, have the power to remove the legislator and replace him or her
with one who will better represent their interests. Parties to a treaty, like a
contract, negotiate every term of the agreement whose four corners
represent the scope of its power over their future actions.
The essence of a treaty as a negotiated instrument is clear from its
definition.96 The Merriam-Webster Legal Dictionary, in fact, offers one
definition of a treaty as “a contract in writing between two or more
political authorities.”97 Because a treaty is an agreement between two or
more parties, the intentions alone of the separate parties will not determine
how the provisions of their agreement should be interpreted. However,
U.S. courts have a tendency to look at the individual “intent” of the U.S.
treaty-drafters in determining whether an obligatory provision should be
deemed “self-executing” and therefore have any domestic legal effect.
This approach of looking at the intent of an individual party in entering
into a contract, when the plain language of the contract admits of no
ambiguity, in order to determine the enforceability of that contract, is
clearly at odds with fundamental principles of equity.
96

Id.

97

Id (emphasis added).
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Surely other nations should be able to rely on the obligations that
the U.S. assumes in its treaties without having to worry about a potential
unilateral defense that courts can create by examining the supposed
“intent” of the American treaty drafters. If the perceived reliability of the
U.S. to adhere to treaty obligations continues to deteriorate while U.S.
courts fail to enforce those obligations domestically, then other treaty
parties may feel compelled to rely on alternative enforcement methods.
As in the domestic context, the manifestations of these results are
unpredictable and, therefore, undesirable.
2. International Law Supports Contract Interpretation
Method
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
instructs the judicial organ interpreting a treaty to adopt the ordinary
meaning of the terms within the treaty. 98 Only when the text of the treaty
is either obscure, ambiguous or leads to a result, which is patently
unreasonable, may the interpreting body look to supplementary means.99
Section 325 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations acknowledges this as
the internationally recognized and accepted method of interpreting an
international agreement. “An international agreement is to be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to its
terms in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”100 The
comments to this section of the Restatement make it clear that the
tendency of U.S. courts to resort to travaux preparatoires in interpreting

98

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 84, at art. 31.

99

Id. at art. 32.

100

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 78, §325 (1).
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international agreements is inconsistent with the Vienna Convention.101
Such a method of interpretation could be argued as a breach of
international law itself, but that is outside the scope of this article.102
What is important to notice here is that the Vienna Convention makes no
mention of the subjective “intent” of the treaty drafters when discussing
the proper mode of interpreting international agreements. Appropriately,
the Restatement makes no mention of it either.
However, when one turns to section 111 of the Restatement, one is
surprised to discover that the subjective intent of the United States is the
determining factor in whether a treaty is self-executing and ultimately if
its terms are enforceable in domestic courts.103 Section 111 begins by
reiterating the Supremacy Clause, asserting that international agreements
of the U.S. are supreme law in the U.S. and dominant over the several
states.104 Subsection (3) goes on to say that the U.S. courts are to give
effect to the international agreements of the U.S. unless they are “non-selfexecuting.”105 Subsection (4) then provides three factors, each of which
will fatally render a treaty “non-self-executing.”106 The first of these
101

Id. cmts. e-f. The travaux preparatoires (French for “preparatory works”) are the
explanatory documents and requests submitted by the potential parties to the treaty
commission during the treaty-drafting process.
102

Though the U.S. has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it is has arguably become
binding on all Nations as customary international law. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP
R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 2001-2002 EDITION (Aspen
Law & Business 2001).
103

Supra note 78, § 111 cmt. h.

104

“International law and international agreements of the United States are law of the
United States and supreme over the law of the several states.” Id. § 111(1).
105

“Courts in the United States are bound to give effect to international law and to
international agreements of the United States, except that a “non-self-executing”
agreement will not be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation.”
Id. § 111(3).
106

The three factors are:
(a) if the agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as
domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation,
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factors seems to be the source of the “subjective intent” analysis: “if the
agreement manifests an intention that it shall not become effective as
domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation.”107
How the subjective intent of the U.S. treaty-drafters is related to
subsection (4)(a) is not clear. To say that an “agreement” must “manifest
an intention” is not instructive to an analysis of the subjective intent of the
treaty-drafter.

Even from the plain language, analyzing it from a

grammatical standpoint, the word “agreement” is the subject of the verb
“manifest,” which takes the noun “intention” as its direct object. The
“agreement” referred to in subsection (4) (a) is presumably the
“international agreement” that begins the subsection. The treaty is the
subject of the sentence and is performing the action of the verb. The
subject of a transitive verb must perform some action upon the verb’s
object.

A treaty can only “manifest” an “intention” in one way: by

expression in written words. Assuming subsections (b) and (c) are met,108
the inquiry as to whether a treaty is self-executing under sub (a) simple: if
the treaty does not expressly provide for implementing legislation, then
none should be required to give it legal effect.109 It is important to note
the presumption of self-execution expressed in section 111 by looking at it
as a whole: subsection (1) says that international law is supreme law of the

(b) if the Senate in giving consent to a treaty, or Congress by resolution, requires
implementing legislation, or
(c) if implementing legislation is constitutionally required.
Id. § 111(4).
107

Id. § 111(4)(a).

108

Subsection (b) implicates the “later-in-time” rule by addressing a Congressional
resolution, but this issue has been explored extensively by other authors. See Detlev F.
Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach. 95 AM. J. INT’L. L.
313, 313-324 (April, 2001). For a discussion of the implications of subsection (c), see
infra Part IV.A.
109

Supra note 78, § 111(4)(a).
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land; subsection (2) says that cases arising under international law are
within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts; subsection (3) says that courts are
bound by our international agreements unless those agreements are nonself-executing; and subsection (4) delineates the three factors used to
determine whether a treaty is non-self-executing.110 Section 111 makes
non-self-executing treaties the exception rather than the rule, so domestic
courts should evaluate obligatory treaty provisions as prima facie selfexecuting. But comment (h) to Section 111 is very clear about what the
drafters of the Restatement meant by an agreement “manifesting an
intention”:
In the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily for the
United States to decide how it will carry out its
international obligations. Accordingly, the intention of the
United States determines whether an agreement is to be
self-executing in the United States… If the international
agreement is silent as to its self-executing character and
the intention of the United States is unclear, account must
be taken of any statement by the President in concluding
the agreement… Whether an agreement is or is not selfexecuting in the law of another state party to the agreement
is not controlling for the United States.111
It is difficult to determine what about this comment is most perplexing: the
fact that it contradicts and undermines the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, general principles of equity, or the Restatement itself.112

110

See supra note 78 at § 111.

111

Id. cmt. h (emphasis added). This comment is titled: “Self-executing and non-selfexecuting agreements.”
112

It is important to note that while the U.S. has not ratified the Vienna Convention, as of
September 2000, 90 other countries had. Therefore, the Vienna Convention is the most
persuasive authority on the international legal norms for the interpretation of international
agreements in existence today, notwithstanding the failure of the U.S. to ratify it. See
BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTED DOCUMENTS
2001-2002 EDITION (Aspen Law & Business 2001).
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Comment (h) expressly contradicts the section on which it purports
to comment.113

The plain language of section 111 clearly creates a

presumption in favor of finding a treaty self-executing in absence of a
manifest intention otherwise.

However, this comment reverses that

presumption because it explains that if a treaty is “silent as to its selfexecuting character,” then the interpreting body must analyze the intention
of the Executive or the Senate.114 The comment exacerbates this deviation
from its own rule by explicitly expressing that the intention of the U.S. is
dispositive in determining whether a treaty is self-executing.
This inconsistency is nothing more than a microcosm of how
domestic courts have been avoiding the enforceability of treaty provisions.
This inconsistency between section 111 and the comment to this section
demonstrates the current state of domestic affairs: domestic courts are
generally in violation of both international and domestic law with regards
to domestically enforcing international agreements by using subjective
intent to determine whether an obligatory treaty provision is enforceable.
An examination of the history of international prisoner transfer
treaties will serve to illustrate why the intention of the parties entering into
a treaty cannot control how the treaty is implemented domestically. The
reason is simple and it is the same reason why the parol evidence rule
exists: sovereign entities will primarily act in their own self-interest, so
their subjective intention cannot be used to define the scope of agreements
between themselves and other sovereigns.

113

See discussion infra Part IV.C.2..

114

See supra note 78, § 111 cmt. h.
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3. Analysis of Subjective Intent Is Neither Useful nor
Appropriate
The historical perspectives concerning the ultimate purposes
behind the different prisoner transfer treaties to which the U.S. is a party
fail to be cohesive, but they are relevant in order to illustrate why the
subjective intent of the parties regarding the treaties’ domestic
enforceability should not be controlling. For all of the different political
motivations that are cited as to why the U.S. plowed the path for
international prisoner transfer treaties, the common denominator in all of
these treaties is their purported purpose as defined explicitly in each
treaty: to further the rehabilitation of the prisoner.115
It is well-recognized that the most important reason that the U.S.
began negotiating these types of prisoner transfer agreements was because
of the pressure put on the State Department by relatives of Americans who
115

MICHAEL ABBELL, INTERNATIONAL PRISONER TRANSFER, pg. 1-9, Transnational
Publishers, Inc. Ardsley, NJ (2002).

See also, Guidelines for Evaluating Prisoner Applications for Transfer, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/oeo/guidlines.html (last visited March 20, 2005). This is
the official statement of the Attorney General regarding the purpose of these treaties and
what criteria should be used in determining the eligibility for transfer. The following
excerpt demonstrates that the Attorney General’s interpretation of these treaties views
social rehabilitation of the prisoner as their primary purpose:
(1) Likelihood of social rehabilitation.
Beyond the practical concerns of alleviating prison crowding and dealing
administratively with foreign national prisoners, many of whom have very limited
English language ability, the central rationale behind transferring foreign prisoners
to their home countries is to facilitate the prisoner's social rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation is, of course, one of the principal purposes of incarceration in
civilized societies. This goal is expressly stated in the Preambles to most of the
prisoner transfer treaties ("to provide better administration of justice by adopting
methods furthering the offender's social rehabilitation," [Mexican treaty];
"facilitating [the prisoner's] successful reintegration into society," [Canadian treaty];
"further the ends of justice and social rehabilitation of sentenced persons," [COE
Convention]). Prisoner transfer assumes that such social rehabilitation is more likely
to occur in the prisoner's home country, closer to his family and within his own
culture. In addition, since many foreign national prisoners will be deported when
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were imprisoned in South and Central American countries.116 Bolivia is
the most noteworthy in this regard. In 1977, there were 35 young
Americans imprisoned there, held on various narcotics charges. Many of
these detainees had been held for years without ever being tried.117
Relatives of these young people formed a lobby group in Washington D.C.
and succeeded in attracting enough attention and publicity to make
prisoner transfer rights a priority for the State Department.118 Indeed, Vice
President Walter Mondale wrote, in a letter to the Cyrus Vance, Legal
Advisor for the State Department at the time, “I wanted to call the case to
your personal attention to underscore the concern to these parents and
relatives and their hope that a solution satisfactory to all can be found as
soon as possible.”119
A three-man team was sent to Bolivia to investigate the situation of
Americans being detained and possible ways to get them returned to the
jurisdiction of the U.S.120 The team consisted of Gordon Baldwin,
professor of law at the University of Wisconsin School of Law who was
also working as a contractor for the State Department at the time, Sam
Moscowitz, a foreign service officer, and Louis Fields, a State Department

their sentences have been served, it may not make sense to further their adjustment to
a society in which they will not be allowed to remain after release. (emphasis added).
116

See supra note 115 at 1-7..

117

Gordon B. Baldwin, Americans in Bolivian Sails, THE GARGOYLE ALUMNI BULLETIN
Vol. 8 No. 4 (1977) (On file with
Professor Gordon Baldwin Evjue-Bascom Emeritus Professor of Law, University of
Wisconsin Law School).

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL,

118

Conversation with Professor Gordon B. Baldwin, Evjue-Bascom Emeritus Professor
of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School (November 18, 2002).
119

Letter from Walter Mondale, Vice President of the U.S., to Cyrus Vance, Secretary of
State (Feb. 11, 1977) (on file with Professor Gordon Baldwin at the University of
Wisconsin Law School).

120

See Baldwin, supra note 117 at 10.
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lawyer.121 The team reported that while there was no evidence of
American prisoners being discriminated against in any way, the lack of a
developed prison or judicial system led to grotesque physical conditions
and periods of detention pending trial that could be viewed as a violation
of due process.122 As Professor Baldwin noted in a conversation with this
article’s author, the State Department’s motivation in drafting these
treaties was primarily to get Americans out of prisons in underdeveloped
countries.123 At the time, he noted, there was little concern in Washington
about the status of foreign nationals incarcerated in the U.S.124 Professor
Detlev Vagts, who drafted and negotiated these prisoner transfer
instruments upon Professor Baldwin’s return to the University of
Wisconsin Law School, related the same intention of the U.S. in
negotiating these agreements.125

Professor Vagts also added that the

intention of the U.S. was not only to get U.S. citizens out of foreign
prisons and back onto U.S. soil, but also to specifically negotiate these
treaties so as to allow Americans to be furloughed upon their return to the
U.S.126 This is ironic because, currently, the biggest concern the U.S. has
regarding the transfer of foreign nationals back to their home country is
the retaining the assurance that those nationals will actually serve out their
sentences if they are returned.127

121

Id.

122

Id.

123

See Conversation with Professor Gordon B. Baldwin, supra note 118.

124

Id.

125

Telephone conversation with Professor Detlev F. Vagts, Bemis Professor of
International Law, Harvard Law School (Oct. 28, 2002).

126

Id.

127

The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Evaluating Prisoner Applications for Transfer
demonstrates this point:
(2) Law enforcement concerns.
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History does not speak to the role of rehabilitation as the primary
purpose of our early bilateral treaties. Mexico, for example, was being
widely criticized in the 1970’s for its negative treatment of American
prisoners, and so it encouraged a treaty with the U.S. in order to alleviate
the adverse effect that this bad publicity was having on its tourism.128 The
U.S.’ treaty with Panama was necessary in order to give Panama
jurisdiction over the prisoners in the formerly U.S. controlled Canal Zone.
This was executed by transferring the prisoner to Panamanian custody
rather than transfer them to a U.S. prison.129 A prisoner transfer treaty
with Canada was convenient because of close diplomatic and law
enforcement relations as a consequence of geographic proximity.130

Social rehabilitation is not the only purpose of incarceration, and therefore
cannot be the sole consideration in evaluating prisoner transfer requests or take
precedence over all other objectives. Law enforcement and justice concerns
must also be considered, regardless of the possible consequences for the
prisoner's social rehabilitation. These considerations are the normal ones in any
sentencing or parole decision:
(e) Possible sentencing disparity. When a prisoner is transferred, responsibility for
administering his sentence belongs exclusively to the receiving country. Under
most of the bilateral treaties, the receiving country takes over the transferred
sentence, but that sentence is then carried out under the laws and regulations of
the receiving country, including any provisions for reduction of the term of
confinement by parole, conditional release, good time release, or otherwise.
Under the French and Turkish bilateral treaties and the COE Convention, the
receiving country has the additional option of converting the sending country's
sentence, through either a judicial or administrative procedure, into its own
sentence; that is, the receiving country may substitute the penalty under its own
laws for a similar offense. (There are certain limitations on converting the
sentence. The receiving country is bound by the findings of facts insofar as they
appear from the judgment, cannot convert a prison term into a fine, and cannot
lengthen the prison term.) However, regardless of whether the sentence is
continued or converted, responsibility for administering it rests solely with the
receiving state.
See Guidelines for Evaluating Prisoner Applications for Transfer, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/oeo/guidlines.html (last visited March 20, 2005).
128

See ABBELL, supra note 115 at 1-7.

129

Id. at 1-6.

130

Id. at 1-7.
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The COE Convention expressly states that furthering the
rehabilitation prisoners was one of its primary goals.131 Due to geography,
the European situation in regards to foreign prisoners was much different
from that of the U.S. in the 1960’s and 1970’s. For example, in some
European countries, more than 30% of all prisoners were foreigners.132
The U.S. did not suffer this burden of housing such a large percentage of
other countries’ nationals.133 Besides the obvious problem of cost, there
are administrative difficulties that need to be addressed with foreign
prisoners.134 A staff that speaks the language of these prisoners must be on
hand and consideration must be given to their different cultural and dietary
needs.135 So not only is the sentencing country taking on a financial
burden by housing more prisoners, but those additional prisoners actually
cost significantly more because of the additional administrative
expenses.136
Officials of some European countries also expressed concern about
the treatment of foreign prisoners in European prisons.137 Their complaint
was essentially that foreigners were generally discriminated against and so
their life in prison was much more difficult than ordinary prison life.138 All

131

See supra note 2.

132

See ABBELL, supra note 115 at 1-7.

133

Id. It is interesting to note that the situation is quite different in the U.S. today. As of
January 2002, about 30% of the federal inmate population was foreign nationals. About
54% of those foreign nationals were Mexican nationals. See id. at 10.
134

Id. at 15.

135

Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.

138

ABBELL, supra note 115, at 15.
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of these problems led to the desire for a European prisoner exchange
program of some sort, and ultimately the COE Convention.139
In 1962, a subcommittee of the Council of Europe in the European
Committee on Crime Problems (ECCP) began work on the European
Convention on the International Validity of Criminal judgments in order to
facilitate the development of an exchange program between European
nations.140 This program is ultimately considered a failure because of
several

inadequacies,

including

its

cumbersome

complexity,

its

requirement that only the sentencing country could request a transfer, and
the reality that the Convention could impose a transfer on a prisoner
against his will.141 Indeed, considering the last two of these issues, it does
not seem that the Convention had the rehabilitation of the prisoner
foremost in mind. Rather, it appears that the Convention was more
concerned with giving the sentencing country the right to expel an undue
burden.
Because very few countries ratified the treaty and very few
prisoners were transferred under it, the problems that existed before the
Convention existed very much after its ratification.142 Consequently, in
1979 the ECCP considered giving a European prisoner exchange program
another try by considering “the possibility of drawing up a model
agreement providing for a simple procedure for the transfer of prisoners
which could be used between member states or by member states in their
relations with non-member states.”143 The failure of the former
Convention and the success of the U.S. in fashioning and implementing
139

Id.

140

Id. at 1-9.

141

Id.

142

Id.

143

Id.
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bilateral prisoner transfer treaties with Canada and Mexico prompted the
Ministers of the Council of Europe to invite the U.S. and Canada to act in
an advisory role in the negotiations at COE.144 The negotiations ultimately
led to the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, which was
fundamentally modeled on the bilateral treaties of the U.S. As of
November 24, 2002, 40 of the 43 members of the Council of Europe had
signed the treaty into force. These countries include Australia, Bahamas,
Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Israel, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, the
United States, and Yugoslavia.145 The success of the COE Convention
ultimately led to the Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal
Sentences Abroad, which was opened for signature in 1993.146 As of
November 24, 2002, this treaty was in force for Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, the United States, and
Venezuela.147
While it is obvious when looking at these treaties in their historical
context that their primary motivations were political rather than
humanitarian, the motivations of the treaty-drafters should not be
controlling in determining the extent of the treaty’s enforceability. The
U.S. should not release all Americans who are returned to U.S. custody
from Bolivia even though it was the “intent” of the U.S. when was
drafting that bilateral treaty. Clearly the principle of reciprocity did not
allow the U.S. to bargain for a term that would allow the U.S. to release all
of its nationals upon their return to native soil while simultaneously
144

ABBELL, supra note 115, at 1-9.

145

See Council of Europe, List of Signatories and Ratifications for ETS Number 112, at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/112.htm. (last visited March 20,
2005).
146
147

Id.

See Inter-American Convention on Serving Criminal Sentences Abroad, at
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-57.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2002).
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ensuring that other parties to the treaty would honor sentences imposed on
their nationals by the U.S. Such a patently inequitable agreement could
not be motivated by the principles of free contract, but more likely by
principles of extortion and coercion. Accordingly, the U.S. should not
unilaterally assert its own intentions to limit the domestic enforceability of
these international agreements.

V. Ex Parte Young: A Tool to Compel State Compliance with
Treaty Obligations
It is necessary that U.S. courts enforce its treaty obligations under
the COE Convention for two fundamental reasons: 1) to promote the
rehabilitation of foreign prisoners and 2) to promote international comity
and thereby encourage reciprocal treatment of detained American
nationals abroad. As demonstrated throughout this article, the U.S. has an
express obligation to promptly inform foreign nationals of parties to the
COE Convention of their rights under that treaty, those nationals who are
detained in U.S. federal and state prisons have a right to be so informed.148
No evidence currently is available that shows the federal government is in
breach of this obligation, but the individual states that comprise this nation
are frequent violators. Federal courts should utilize the Ex parte Young
doctrine to overcome state sovereign immunity and allow foreign
nationals to seek prospective relief from state officials to ensure future
state compliance.149

148

See discussion infra Part II.

149

See Young, supra note 3, at 155-156:
The various authorities we have referred to furnish ample justification for the
assertion that individuals who, as officers of the state, are clothed with some
duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten or
are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to
enforce against parties an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal
Constitution, may be enjoined by a federal court of equity from such action.
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Suits against a state or a state official are normally barred by the
principle of sovereign immunity, but the doctrine of Ex parte Young is the
judicially created exception to the 11th amendment150 which is used to
vindicate the supremacy of federal law established by the Constitution.151
The Young doctrine dictates that while federal courts are unable to directly
command states as states, they do have the power to “enjoin state officials
in their official capacities.”152 The Supreme Court has mandated the use
of a simple, two-part test to determine whether such a complaint survives
the sovereign immunity defense: 1) there must be a violation of federal
law, and 2) prospective relief must be sought.153
The inadequacy of state implementing legislation is evidence of
the failure of the U.S. states to comply with the terms of the treaties.
Though the rights created under the COE convention and other prisoner
transfer treaties are clearly self-executing in nature, federal and stateimplementing legislation has been enacted to provide the necessary
statutory machinery to carry out the obligations under these treaties and
their deficiency serves as additional evidence of state non-compliance.
With few exceptions, they are skeletal in substance and clearly fail to

This doctrine has since been expanded to include all federal law, not just federal
constitutional law. See Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Maryland, 122
S. Ct. 1753, 1760 (2002).
150

U.S. CONST. amend XI: “The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state.”

151

See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

152

See Hutto v. Finney, 98 S. Ct. 2565, 2573. (1978).

153

See Verizon, supra note 149, at 1760: “In determining whether the doctrine of Ex
parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a
‘straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of
federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” (quoting Idaho v.
d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 296 (1997)).
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address the prisoner’s right to notification.154 One commentator has noted
that “simply put, many of the U.S. states’ [implementing] legislation does
not encourage or actively facilitate the transfer of prisoners under the
transfer treaties….[t]he failure to notify eligible prisoners of the possibility
of transfer contravenes the transfer treaties.” 155 Currently, only five states
have implementing legislation that requires correctional officers to inform
foreign nationals of their right to transfer.156 Also recall that the 1997
declaration of the U.S. to the COE Convention concedes that: “there are
154

Wyoming’s transfer statute is a good example of a typical state statute:
7-13-106. Transfer of citizen or national of foreign country.
The governor may act on behalf of the state to consent to the transfer of a citizen
or national of a foreign country pursuant to a treaty between the United States
and the foreign country of which the person is a citizen or national.” See WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 7-13-106.

In contrast, New Jersey law provides extensive guidelines on the authority of the state to
authorize transfer and the prisoner’s eligibility therein, but nowhere obligates correctional
authorities to notify a prisoner of their right to transfer. See Subchapter 6, Subtitle 5B
International Transfers, Chapter 7D Prisoner Transfer Treaties, Subchapter 6,
International Transfers 10A:10-6.1 – 10A:10-6.9.
To see most of the state implementing legislation that exists, visit Individual State
Prisoner Statutes, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/oeo/prisonert.htm, (last visited March
20, 2005).
155

See Finkelstein, supra note 59, at 153.

156

Those states are Kentucky, see KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196.073 (1994), see also
Kentucky Corrections, Policies and Procedures, International Transfer of Inmates, Policy
number 18.18 § V.A. (1995); Massachusetts, see MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 578 § 97B
(1985), see also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 103, § 462.07 (1985); New York, see N.Y.
CORRECT.LAW 71 (1-a); Washington, see WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.350 (1985), see also
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 137-67-025; and California, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 2912 (West
Supp. 1997). The Washington Administrative Code section 137-67-025, entitled “initial
notification” provides for timely notification of inmates:
At the time of admission to the Washington corrections center, or the Purdy
corrections center for women, the orientation information given to all inmates
will include information on international offender transfers. An inmate who is a
citizen of a treaty nation will be informed of the existing treaty and be provided
with the opportunity to indicate an interest or non interest [sic] in a transfer to
the inmate's country of origin or citizenship on an application form provided by
the department. Whenever possible, the form will be bilingual or translated into
the inmate's native language. The application will be processed consistent with
the purpose and provisions of the applicable treaty
(emphasis added).
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some states which authorize few, or no, transfers notwithstanding the
statutory authority to consent.”157
The obligation to inform foreign national detainees is absolutely
necessary in order for the treaty to achieve its express goal of promoting
rehabilitation and for the same reason that the U.S. is obligated to inform
foreign nationals of their right to consular access under the VCCR: the
detainee must be aware of his rights in order to exercise them. To put this
in perspective, the reader must imagine the typical situation of a foreign
national arrestee who is eligible for transfer. The detainee is are likely to
be completely ignorant of international legal norms, rights to consular
access, and the other mechanisms that nations have constructed to
encourage international comity and the development of basic human
rights. He was probably raised in an economically depressed country with
little or no education, but out of desperation decided to try his luck
working in a more affluent nation, but with no intention of permanent
immigration. The people most important to him probably remained in his
native country. It is very typical for husbands to leave their wives and
children for months or years at a time, returning home after they have
accumulated however much money they were able to save. Of course,
these circumstances do not justify the commission of whatever felony
ultimately causes that person to be arrested, convicted, and sentenced to
prison, but the prisoner transfer treaties were drafted with the
understanding that civilized nations strive to rehabilitate prisoners,158 and
157

See supra note 61, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=112&CM=8&DF=
30/01/05&CL=ENG&VL=1.

158

See COE Convention, supra note 2see also Mission Statement of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons, which reads: “It is the mission of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to protect
society by confining offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and communitybased facilities that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure, and that
provide work and other self-improvement opportunities to assist offenders in becoming
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that this goal is seriously undermined if someone is forced to remain
incarcerated while completely removed from a familiar society. It is also
important to remember that only prisoners with low culpability are likely
candidates for transfer, and they are the best candidates for rehabilitation.
Prisoners are more likely to facilitate their own rehabilitation and social
reintegration if they have a tangible motivation to do so, i.e., they are near
to the people who care for them in a familiar culture. One can imagine the
terminal negative impact that 10 years in prison would have if one could
not effectively communicate and did not have a single visitor during that
time.
These are the problems that the COE Convention and other
international prisoner transfer treaties seek to ameliorate, but they cannot
be effective unless the individuals that the treaties are designed to benefit
are aware of them. That is why these treaties create an obligation for the
sending State to promptly inform the national of his or her rights pursuant
to their terms, and consequently, why it is so important that domestic
courts see to it that those rights are protected. Ex Parte Young is the tool
that district courts should use to accomplish this.159
A foreign national of a member country to the COE Convention,
who was not notified of their right to apply for a transfer back to their
home country, has clearly suffered an injury in violation of federal law
and therefore satisfies the first prong of the test. The detainee would be
precluded from retrospective relief, such as money damages, but money
damages do not seem to be an appropriate remedy in this context
irrespective of that limitation. Money damages are inappropriate because
it fails 1) to further the rehabilitation of the prisoner, and 2) promote
law-abiding citizens”, at http://www.bop.gov/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) (emphasis
added).
159

See supra note 149.
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international comity. The specifics concerning the type of provisional
remedy sought and precisely which state officials could be brought as
defendants are more complex issues of domestic civil litigation and thus
beyond the scope of this article.
It should be noted, however, that the Young doctrine has been
interpreted to give the courts a great deal of power to penalize the states
for failure to comply with federal law.160

If a foreign national was

successful in securing some type of prospective relief that sought to bring
the state in compliance with the terms of the COE Convention, but the
state continued to be deficient, the federal court could impose large
financial penalties or even hold the state in contempt.161 This would
undoubtedly be viewed as a bold assertion of judicial power, but its
impetus would be nothing more than the application of the most ordinary
meaning of the Constitution and U.S. treaty obligations taken together,
and such an application should be seized upon if the opportunity is
presented.

As Justice Harlan noted in Chew Hong v. United States

“[a]side from the duty imposed by the Constitution to respect treaty
stipulations when they become the subject of judicial proceedings, … the
honor of the government and people of the United States is involved in

160

See Hutto, supra note 152, at 2573-74.

161

See id. The strength of the court’s language tells of no ambiguity:
The present case requires application of that principle. In exercising their
prospective powers under Ex parte Young and Edelman v. Jordan, federal courts
are not reduced to issuing injunctions against state officers and hoping for
compliance. Once issued, an injunction may be enforced. Many of the court's
most effective enforcement weapons involve financial penalties. If a state agency
refuses to adhere to a court order, a financial penalty may be the most effective
means of insuring compliance. The principles of federalism that inform Eleventh
Amendment doctrine surely do not require federal courts to enforce their decrees
only by sending high state officials to jail. The less intrusive power to impose a
fine is properly treated as ancillary to the federal court's power to impose
injunctive relief (emphasis in original).
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every inquiry whether rights secured by such stipulations shall be
recognized and protected.”162
Of course, the current Supreme Court may not allow the federal
courts to undermine federalism in this manner ostensibly. Such a position
would be unfortunate, for while the author is a proponent of the federalist
structure of the U.S. government and the importance of the protections
that this divided republic ensures individual liberty, he does not believe
that the Constitution allows the states to diminish the ability of the U.S. to
effectively manage its foreign relations. The reluctance of domestic courts
to enforce U.S. treaty obligation per se undermines the ability of the courts
to enforce the power of the Executive and the Senate to effectively
manage our foreign relations while the frequency of state governments
engaging directly in foreign affairs is increasing.163

This problem is

severely exacerbated by the increasing perception that the U.S. does not
respect the rule of international law. The principles of international comity
and the desire for reciprocal treatment of U.S. citizens abroad should
encourage domestic courts to enforce treaty obligations in order to help
diminish these problems.
Many commentators have addressed the problem of foreign
distrust of the United States and the problems that it could pose for
American citizens abroad and the rule of international law generally.
Samuel Berger, former National Security Adviser to President Clinton,
summarizes the issue:
…when our goals are embodied in binding agreements, we
can gain international support in enforcing them when they
are violated. By the same token, nothing undermines U.S.
authority more than the perception that the United States
162
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See Richard B. Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J.
INT’L. L. 821 (October, 1989).
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considers itself too powerful to be bound by the norms we
preach to others.164
Professor Detlev Vagts noted in a 2001 article that recent treaty
controversies have been provoking “serious resentment abroad,” and
further noted that “…the executive, Congress, the courts, and influential
commentators have each conspicuously verbalized the idea… that the
binding effect of international law carries little weight. This attitude, at a
time when many foreigners distrust the United States as too powerful and
too aware of that power, jeopardizes the conduct of our foreign affairs.”165
Surely what is most disturbing about Prof. Vagts’ comment is that
it was made before the Bush administration’s unilateral initiative to attack
Iraq with or without the consent of the U.N. Security Council.166 The U.S.
is setting a poor example as the only remaining superpower in the world,
for if other nations cannot rely on the U.S. to respect international law as
binding then it is unlikely that other nations are going to honor the claims
of the U.S. when it is invoked by the U.S. It has taken human civilization
a very long time to come to Article 2, paragraph 4 incorporated into an
internationally “binding” agreement such as the UN Charter, which is why
164

Samuel R. Berger, Foreign Policy for a Democratic President, 83 No. 3 FOR. AFF. 47,
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the first case brought before the ICJ where the U.S. had executed a foreign national who
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See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 99 (Nov.
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See Neil MacFarquar with Patrick E. Tyler, Iraq Issues U.N. Demands and Destroys
More Missiles, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2003, International: “Both at the United Nations
and in Washington, diplomats and Bush administration officials expressed growing
concern that if the United States called for a vote on the resolution and lost it, the
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the Charter, like all other international obligations, should be given legally
binding effect.167

As another commentator noted in a 1998 article

commenting on the failure of the U.S. to enforce its treaty obligations
under the VCCR in Breard: “…the Executive can also be far more vigilant
in seeking compliance with the [VCCR]. Its claims before our courts
portend miserable representation of U.S. citizens abroad.”168
Because the states are “major sources of treaty violations,”169 the
proper exercise of judicial power to assert the supremacy of federal law
over the states inherent in our treaty obligations would serve to increase
international comity and reciprocal treatment of Americans abroad.
Surely this type of authority would serve to ultimately ensure, at the very
least, that states would adopt policies and procedures commensurate with
the nation’s treaty obligations. Perhaps, even more importantly, it would
encourage U.S. treaty drafters to take more care in drafting treaty
obligations. This solution is ideal because the U.S. would be improving
its foreign relations by both its internal and external procedures.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The United States has provoked serious resentment abroad because
the federal courts have been unwilling to enforce the unambiguous terms
of U.S. treaty obligations on the States even though the Constitution and
current international legal norms clearly mandate the authority and
responsibility to do so.

Domestic courts have created obstacles to

enforcement of treaty-based rights in order to avoid the uncertainty
inherent in interpreting international law and to protect the federalist
167
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Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state…”
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structure of our republic where no such protection is needed or was
intended. This problem has been recently exacerbated by assertions of
unilateral authority by the executive branch in violation of our UN Charter
obligations. Federal courts should use the opportunity to assert federal
supremacy in the area of foreign relations by clearly defining its
boundaries within constitutional limits.

This approach to treaty

interpretation would not damage either sphere of sovereignty, but rather it
would promote the ability of the United States to effectively manage its
foreign affairs by limiting the ability of the States to breach our
international compacts, which is a power they were never intended to
have. This could ameliorate some of the damage done to our international
reputation in recent years, but time is running short. The United States not
only needs to assert the ability to speak with one voice, but we need to
ensure that this voice speaks in support of the rule of law.

